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This article looks at the moral culpabi lity 
of the business professional for the globa l 
financial cr isis (GFC) and in relation to corporate 
scanda l generally. It invE;stigates the types of 
moral fa il ings of t he professional-turpitude, 
coward ice, incompetence and the need for 
moral character and moral agency. Th is article 
cautions aga inst a purely leg islative approach to 
stop corporate scanda l and practices t hat led to 
the GFC and argues instead for a strengthening 
and broadening of professional associations 
to support and hold the business professiona l 
accountab le and to promote moral agency. 
In the 1930s, the German Nazi government contracted 
IBM to assist in th e compi lation of the German census 
results. IBM was the owner of the Hollerith machine-
the most advanced commercia l computation mach ine 
ava ilable at the t ime. The German census also included 
data on race, which was used to devastating effect 
(Di llard 2003). The grisly details provided by Dilla rd (2003) 
demonstrate that the census was of great help to the 
Nazis in locating and capturi ng Gel'man Jews and Roma. 
The question arises as to the culpability of IBM and its 
lose out if the princip les (and legal ity) of not br ibing 
were scrupulously fo llowed. The slippery slope is 
apparent here, and in turn mora l turp itude can easily 
be rat iona li sed away It takes a strong mora l characte r 
to kn ow what the righ t course of action is and not to 
be seduced under such ci rcumstances. In the GFC, one 
may well be able to pick out examples of professi onals 
who were corrupt or who, having found out w hat was 
going on, decided that the best cou rse of action fo r all 
concern ed was to ride out the storm. 
techn icians. How much did IBM know about the Nazis? Moral cowardice occu rs when the professional does 
How much shou ld they have known? How much should not partic ipate d irectl y in any moral w rongdoing, but 
the information and business professionals working for looks th e other way and does noth ing about it and/ 
IBM have known about the evi l intentions and practices or only undertakes some min ima l and ineffectual 
of the Nazis? These are the questions I put to my business action (Bauman 1989; Macintyre 2006) It wou ld not 
students in thei r ethics class. I ask them to consider how 
much they need to know beyond their direct sphere of 
expertise and to consider the courage that they need in 
order to be a moral agent- a professiona l 
Over the past decade or so, we have had various major 
business scandals and crises- the Asian fi nancia l cr ises, 
Enron, Worldcom, Arthur Andersen, OneTel, HIH, AWB, 
and now the current GFC and the role of banks and 
cred it rat ing agencies. To what extent are business 
professiona ls cu lpable in these crises? To what extent are 
business professionals part of the solution to avoid such 
meltdowns, corruption and unprofessiona l practice? Th is 
paper goes some way to answering these quest ions. 
Cu lpability and the professional 
Culpabi lity ta kes several forms; for example, moral 
tU I'p itude, cowardice and incompetence are the most 
obvious and straightforward, but there is also a lack 
of moral agency. Mora l turpitude is a clear case of 
cu lpabil ity (Wolters 1976) It is one where the professional 
knowing ly engages in corrupt act ivity in order to benefit 
personally. The benefit could be, among other things, 
monetary, cal'eer advancement or increased status. 
Th ings become more complicated when we are faced 
w ith competing moral ends. In real life, we are often 
caught between moral ends and have to choose. Most 
of us w ill quite readi ly te ll wh ite lies to protect what 
we see as the greater good, A case in point is that of 
th e AWB and t he sa le of wheat to Iraq (Overington 
2006). Here it mig ht be argued that bribery was an 
undesirable but unavoidab le pa rt of do ing bu si ness in 
Ira q. Other nations we re seeming ly prepared to bribe 
the Iraq i offic ials, and Austra lian wheat fa rmers wou ld 
be surprising to fi nd that most peop le and most 
professionals wou ld find it exceeding ly difficu lt to 
blow the w histle or take some SOlt of effect ive action 
to prevent w rong doing . Few of us would Willing ly 
ri sk ca reers and social opprobrium to blow the 
wh ist le (Alford 2007), The re are also the d iffi cu lt ies of 
uncertainty. The whist leb lower doesn't have all the 
facts and does not have th e bigger pictu re I suggest 
that many profeSSionals, li ke most people, look the 
other way in th e face of loom ing crises. 
The third area where the professiona l can be culpable 
is what I term moral pretence- that is pretendi ng to 
be something one isn't-represent ing one's ski lls and 
experience to be greater than th ey are or not app lying 
one's professiona l sk il ls w ith due d iligence. Th e bankers 
and the employees of the credit rating agencies 
have been crit icised for thei r lack of competence and 
judgement. It m ust, however, be remembered t hat 
many of the very same bankers were lauded for thei r 
competence and j udgement fo r doing the very same 
things immediate ly prior to the cris is (Lancheste r 2009), 
There would be little argument that the professional w ho 
was corrupt, a coward or recklessly or neg ligently applied 
their skil ls was morally cu lpable. However, is the converse 
true? Is the professiona l, who does not engage directly 
in immoral action, is w illing to expose straightforward 
corruption and always works w ith in the reasonable 
bounds oftheir ski ll and experience, acti ng mora lly? 
The answer is far from clear-cut. Firstly, if we retu rn to 
the open ing example of the IT professional working 
on the 1936 German census, we might conclude that 
the profess ional did nothing wrong-they were not 
direct ly involved, the specifical ly evil character of the 
Nazis had not yet revealed itsel f, and th e person acted 
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within thei r competence. However, some mig ht begin 
to question the professional's w illingness or otherwise 
to examine the moral ity of the case in quest ion. To hear, 
see and speak no ev il does not necessarily exonerate. 
Macintyre (2006) il lustrates this with anoth er exam ple 
drawn from th e Nazi period Suppose a logist ics expert 
efficiently and effect ive ly organises t he movement of 
cargo around Europe. One day he asks his superiors 
about th e nature of the ca rgo and is to ld it is of no 
concern to him and to get on with his work. The 
log ist ics expert does so. Much later, he discovers the 
cargo was weapons of mass destruct ion and people 
destined for gas chambers. Few would suggest that 
the log istics expert was not morally culpable. He 
should have fo und out and acted accord ingly Many 
a mora l story turns on peop le refusi ng to see the 
evidence before t heir eyes. The logist ics expert si mply 
stayed out of t rou ble tak ing a salary, consultancy fees 
and possible ca reer advancement for doing so. 
By th e sa me token, th ere must be tens of th ousands 
of professionals, consultants and experts who also 
knew, or it coul d be argued, should have known, had 
they take n t he trouble, of the shaky foundations of the 
structu red investment vehicles (SIVs), the compromised 
advice of the cred it agencies, the risky dealings of the 
banks and so on. We have the situat ion where many 
professiona ls were either di rectly cu lpable (they knew 
what was going on, but d id nothing) o r indi rect ly 
culpable (they shou ld have known) t hrough fail ing to 
ful ly open their eyes to what was going on. 
Moral culpability also concerns the different advice 
the professional ca n provide On th e one hand, the 
professiona l cou ld provide advice that will maxim ise 
shareholder value, or on the other hand, provide advice 
Good co rporate governance 
The most common response to th e cr ises that have 
beset business over the past decade or so is to increase 
the transparency of th e decision ma king of bu si nesses 
through leg islation . The US Sarbanne-Oxley Act is 
sti ll the most widely ci ted example, and it support s 
the commonsense not ion that few people would 
have acted as they d id were t hey to be found out. 
Executives, board membe l's and managers could be 
sacked for being bad or be ing incompetent. 
It has a certain appea l to the leg islators-they can be 
seen to be doing someth ing. But also, the lawyers win, 
the bureaucrats can mon itor, and my own discipli ne 
(I nformation Systems) ca n develop the systems to 
document the decis ion making. It seems like we 
have winners all round. 
But there are two central limitations to this good-
governance approach The firs t is that the leg islative 
approach is not as effective as we would like (Painter-
Morland 2008). The GFC happened after increased 
corporate governance controls. Certain ly, more regulation 
and more specific financial regu lation would prevent 
some of what happened, but at the possible cost of 
forever increas ing regu lation and potentially hamstringing 
companies. As a young researcher in the Victoria Police, I 
was shown the immense folder of police regulat ions and 
was told by my Inspector, 'See that, there's one regulation 
for every f**k up we've had in the job'. 
Good business management cannot be simply 
leg islated or regu lated for. Here I use the term good 
both in it s sense of being moral, but also in terms of 
it being excellent. Leg islat ion is strongest in terms of 
the prevention and detection of what I ca lled mora l 
that maximises stakeholder va lue (e.g., shareholders, turpitude. However, f rom there on, legislative power 
employees, consumers) Macintyre (2006) found that progressively weakens. Leg islation can on ly bo lster 
energy and power execut ives could read ily provide whistleblowers and oversee professional competency 
diffe rent advice depending on w hether they were to a lim ited extent. It seems much more difficu lt to 
ma nag ing their company for the benefit of shareholders, ensure that people behave moral ly by seeking out 
concerned citizens or families. Often it wou ld seem information or that they maxim ise one set of objectives 
that it is a question of wearing different hats; that is, without considerat ion of others. Ethical pract ice in 
working from particular perspect ives produces different business is ba lancing com peting interests in real time. 
decisions. The idea of wearing d iffe rent hat s was made 
infamous in the NASA Chal lenger disaster where an 
engineer changed his hat from that of an engineer to 
that of a manager and gave the green light for launch-
the wrong choice, as it t urn ed out. 
We can identify several ways that the business professional 
can moral ly fai l. How do we identify such fai lings when 
t hey occur? How do we avert or reduce these fa ilings? 
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A re lated difficu lty is that people would comply or 
undertake various tasks not because they thought it 
right, but because it was not aga inst the law. Peop le, 
abso lved from the responsibi lity of moral it y by t he law 
would seek loopho les-the tax avoidance industry is 
a case in poin t. Fi na ll y, legal ity does not incorporate all 
moral ity. We cannot leg islate fo r th ings like trust and 
friendship, and it wou ld be a sad world if we thought 
we needed to try (Painter-Morland 2008). 
The second major d ifficul ty w ith the leg islat ive 
approach is th e type of world it augu rs. I have al ready 
suggested that it promotes a world of comp liance 
rather than mora lity. It also promotes a world of 
surveillance, It is well recog nised that both mora lity 
and creat ivity requi re privacy (cf Qu inn 2009, p. 
223-225). There is too the old problem of who watches 
the watcher. The Nazi government, after all, was the 
lega l government of Germany. 
To re ly solely or heavily on surveilla nce and 
tra nspa rency legislation is probably self-defeating, 
potent ia lly producing a st ifl ing cultu re of compu lsion 
and survei llance, It is neither a wor ld we would wish to 
live in nor a world we cou ld do good bu si ness in. 
Moral agency and the 
professional 
If legislation is only pa rtly and reluctant ly an answer, 
what else is requi red? Fo llowing the views of Macintyre 
who reintroduced the idea of virtue ethics, we should be 
establishing mora l agency in our citizens, our employees 
and our professionals, Bauman (2008) wryly suggests that 
for some of us, this cure is worse than the disease. There 
is immense dist rust of the morally autonomous agent-
someone thinking and acting according to conscience 
rather than by convention or fol lowing rules. 
Accord ing to Macintyre (2006), moral agency requires 
the capacity to understa nd and present oneself as 
being more t han t he role or offi ce one occupies. It 
means seeing and act ing on a broader view of the 
ci rcumstances and what one should do. Views or roles 
are not changed and acted on according to the role or 
to suit the social or political ci rcumstances. Macintyre 
calls this the virtue of integrity. The manager must not 
on ly see the issue as being, say, maximising shareho lder 
ret urn, but also, say, among other things, a just return to 
the consumer. It is a matter of putting morality, justice, 
fa irness and so on directly into the decision making, 
It involves a set of difficult choices. It doesn't mean 
one view always wins. Macintyre cal ls for the vi rtue of 
constancy-to hold fast, across time and situation such 
that the moral posit ion eventually triumphs. 
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The second part of moral agency requires the 
development of our rational facu lty, so that the 
mora l agent has the abi lity to consider issues and 
ci rcumstances. He or she is no idiot savant w ho sim ply 
knows their na rrowly defined ro les or expertise, but 
makes it his or her business to know and pursue the 
moral issues as part of their work. Final ly, Macintyre 
(2006) argues that moral agency cannot develop in 
iso lation from oth ers . We need to test our views with 
others and to be held accountable for our actions. 
Moral agency is a social enterprise. It is mora l agency 
that distinguishes between the expert or consultant, 
the hired gun and the pro fessiona l who may not give 
the answer one wants. 
It may be suggested that the development of moral 
agency is all very wel l, but many companies will 
prefer to employ experts who do as they are directed, 
ra ther than professiona ls who are also beho lden to 
their profession. Secondly, the idea of developing or 
in develop ing rationa l agency and finally provid ing a 
place for discussing moral issues and accountabi li ty. 
Fina lly, strong professional associations can discipl ine 
those members who morally lapse or misrepresent 
thei r own competence. 
Th is would require a substantia l reth inking of our 
cu rrent approach to the busi ness professions and 
their relationship to business corporations and wou ld 
involve a widening of the exist ing professions in 
business. One area we wou ld need to rethi nk is a knee 
jerk reaction that such associations are fundamentally 
self-serving. Th is is a danger, but a danger that can 
be dea lt w ith. Stronger professions and stronger 
professionals are potentia lly a less burea ucratic 
response and a more Aexible response to the GFC 
and other bungles, crises and wrongdoings than 
comp liance legis lation alone. It may also have the 
advantage of provid ing, th rough federation or national 
professional associations, a g lobal response to the GFC 
strengthen ing moral agency in the business professions Above all, the strengthening of the professional 
may appear a weak and soppy solution to the GFC and 
other ailments of the business wor ld. But it is neit her 
weak nor soppy if it is considered as a form of primary 
prevention bolstered by a new profess iona lism. 
An approach based on mora l agency wou ld require 
the strength ening of professiona l associations and 
their support of their members. Such strengthening 
may need some leg islation and regulation. Currently, 
there is no necessity for business professionals to 
belong to a professional associat ion. Management 
accountants, financ ial and business analysts, IT and 
IS professionals are not req ui red to be members of 
their re leva nt professions in order to practise. The GFC 
and the share market scandals suggest that it is now 
time to consider t his proposal. The amounts of money 
involved and their in fluence on the g loba l economy 
demand the supervision of business professions. 
St rong professiona l associations can support 
their members against th e pressure towards t he 
narrowing perspect ives of the company and it s 
corporate cu lture, and discipl ine their members 
where the professional must in principal j ustify his 
or her actions to the association. Membersh ip of a 
strong professiona l association would support mora l 
agency by strengthen ing the professional's identity, 
providing professiona l deve lopment and assistance 
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associat ions ca n help to reinvigorate the ethica l 
dimension of business, whereas a compliance 
legislative approach may further al ienate eth ics from 
business. We must seek new ways to develop and 
strengthen moral agency in business. There is an 
increasing awareness that business has an ethica l 
base and is essentia l fo r th e establishment of trust and 
networking between businesses and their emp loyees 
(Fukuyama 1995) Strengthening professional 
associations and making the business professional 
accountable to such associations is one step forward. 
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